Action research PhDGerry Roberts -- Chapter 6
Action researching my practice as a facilitator of experiential learning with pastoralist farmers in Central West Queensland
Gerard Michael O’Brien Roberts
B.App.Sc. (Rur. Tech) (Hons); M.Sc. (Wool and An. Sc.)
Chapter 6 My engagement with propositional knowledge in the literature of facilitation
Section 6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I outline the propositional knowledge that informed my reflections related to thesis Argument II presented in Chapter 1. I follow this in Chapter 7 with reflections, observations and interpretations related to my field observations in the light of this knowledge and the concepts developed as a result. The structural links between Chapters 6 and 7 are the same as those between chapters 4 and 5. I described my reasons for this sequence and structure in the introduction to Chapter 4.
The propositional knowledge in this chapter, and my interpretation of it, informed Argument II presented in Chapter 1. That argument relates to the learning outcomes I gained from facilitating experiential learning with pastoralists.
In introducing Chapter 4, I referred to the reasons that I believe contribute to the relative dearth of literature relating to the applied or practical use of experiential learning. The same holds for material on the facilitation of experiential learning.
In reviewing literature relevant to my interest in facilitating experiential learning with
pastoralists, I focused on material related to the role of the facilitator in the development and application of the skills of learning by learners.
I begin with the issue of individuals learning at a higher level without input from a facilitator and examine the frequency of unfacilitated higher level learning before considering the value of facilitation. This is followed by an examination of published support for the facilitation of experiential learning. In so doing I attend to the issue of making the processes used in the facilitation of experiential learning apparent (or transparent) to participants and I consider the effect of transparency of process on collaboration and participation amongst learners.
A particular aspect of facilitation to which I refer is the concept of facilitated discussion. By ‘discussion’ I mean open group discussion that promotes new understanding and the development of participants’ perspectives about issues. Cayer (1997), Isaacs (1993), Bohm (1990) and Senge (1990) refer to such facilitated open discussion as ‘dialogue’.
Another aspect of facilitation referred to is that of ‘congruency of action theories’ (Argyris and Schon 1996). Argyris (1987) posits that action theories are the guidelines we use to design action to achieve intended outcomes, and to monitor the effectiveness of our action in our interactions with others. He suggests that because of the need for their regular use we hold these theories as tacit knowledge about which we don’t consciously think. He suggests that they take two forms, the action theories that we claim we use (espoused theories) and the action theories that can be inferred from our actions (theories-in-use). His claim is that matching these leads to success in interactions. In this chapter I consider congruency of action theories in relation to facilitation.
Section 6.2 Learning at a higher level without facilitation
The issue examined in this section is the likelihood that learners can learn at a higher level from their experiences without input from a facilitator (whose role would be to assist them to learn at the higher level). The literature suggests that this happens but that facilitation enables learning how to learn to be an explicit focus and this provides for the ready future use of learned concepts.
It can be argued that rather than focus on whether or not higher level learning can occur autonomously, it is more fruitful to explore how facilitation can help to ensure all three levels are engaged (Bawden pers comm). I have chosen to focus initially with autonomous learning because learning is a human activity and explicit, structured facilitation of it is a relatively recent occurrence. As such autonomous learning presents the opportunity for beginning to understand how higher level learning can be contextualised in the situation of the learner.
Rogers (1969) suggests that individuals are the instruments of their own learning arguing that "Even when the impetus or stimulus comes from outside, the sense of discovery, of reaching out, of grasping and comprehending, comes from within" (Rogers 1969 p5). It is his suggestion that an individual’s learning takes place through their own experience of the learning situation. Boud and Walker (1990) concur, suggesting that "While facilitators, and others, can help create the milieu [of learning], it is the learner who creates the experience" (p62). These observations are consistent with the concept of self-directedness or autonomy of learning (Mezirow 1991; Brookfield 1993; Bawden et al 1984) and the phenomenon of higher level learning occurring without the aid of a facilitator.
Perry’s (1970) work related to formal education situations also identifies that individuals learn at higher levels without facilitation. He uses individuals’ learning while attaining a college education to create his framework for describing cognitive development. The higher level learning or cognitive development that takes place transcends the content of the task (Perry 1970). It comes about through the learners’ engagement with the experience of learning itself, as they consider how they learn about the task. This is supported by Klaczynski (1994 p165) who claims that "Individuals not only change the solutions they use for everyday problems as they progress from one task to the next, but as they encounter new demands and conflicting expectations, they change the way they interpret and explain events within these contexts." The existence of cognitive restructuring that accommodates evolving understanding is recognised by Nonaka (1994 p17) with his proposition that "Individuals are continuously committed to recreating the world in accordance with their own [changing] perspectives". Such changes can be equated with the meaning scheme alterations and perspective transformations presented by Mezirow (1981; 1991) as his interpretation of higher level learning.
Klaczynski’s (1994 p141) work is more recent than Perry’s and provides further evidence of "... a relationship between practical intellectual development and life course contexts." He, like Perry, worked with students, and his results support the concept of cognitive progression or higher level learning stimulated by life course events. "With the problem-solving results, these results imply that everyday problem solving is not only a mechanism that allows individuals to cope more effectively with contextual demands, but also that everyday problem solving develops in response to these demands ..." Klaczynski (1994 p165). His work highlights how increasing interactions over time, within their chosen educational field, enabled students to learn how to deal with situations that they had previously regarded as unsolvable dilemnas. They did this in ways that provided "... smoother and potentially less anxiety-provoking interactions with other members of particular contexts and reduced the discrepancy between events that occur within those contexts and the individual’s beliefs about those events" (Klaczynski 1994).
From the work of Perry (1970) and Klaczynski (1994) it appears that higher level learning about ‘life’ events prompts cognitive development. As such cognitive development itself represents higher level learning for change where it progresses to level three or epistemic cognitive development.
Klaczynski (1994) observed that while his results showed cognitive progression in one field, there was only a low correlation between specific practical problem solving and general intellectual functioning. He suggests that cognitive progression developed of necessity in one field, is not necessarily followed by the transfer and application of the skills of that state to other fields of the individual’s endeavour.
Nonaka (1994 p20) makes a similar assertion when proposing that "... knowledge ... may be limited and, as a result, difficult to apply in fields beyond the specific context in which it was created." Neither Perry (1970) nor Kitchener (1983) seem to have addressed the transfer of cognitive progression across different domains, yet clearly this is a matter of some significance. Of particular significance is the knowledge that the cognitive progression or higher level learning reported by Klaczynski (1994) came in response to interactions with non-facilitated events.
Brookfield (1986) agrees that individuals learn without the aid of facilitation. He suggests that "... ‘lifelong learning’ is an empirical reality .... in that adults learn throughout the developmental stages of adulthood in response to life crises, for the innate joy of learning, and for specific task purposes" (Brookfield 1986 p26). However, he also recognises that some adults reject such events and opportunities as triggers for change arguing that "There are many individuals who are chronologically adult but who show a marked disinclination to behave in anything approaching a self-directed manner in many areas of their lives." (Brookfield 1986 p26). He proposes that it is the experiential learning that takes place for individuals, either formally or informally, that takes them through the stages of cognitive development. A construction of these stages comes from the work by Perry (1970) and Kitchener (1983). Kitchener’s (1983) observations are congruent with Brookfield’s (1986) suggestion of the link between learning and cognitive development. She proposes that it is through dealing with ‘ill-structured’ problems that individuals progress in cognitive development. It is in informal situations that Brookfield (1986) and Kitchener and King (1981) recognise the occurrence of unfacilitated higher level learning.
Kitchener and King (1981) also supports the concept that individuals can learn without facilitation at a higher level. They use the concept of reflective judgement to describe how individuals learn in ill-structured problematic situations, reinforcing the idea raised by Brookfield (1986), that not all individuals progress naturally or at the same pace through the constructed stages of cognitive development.
From these works I conclude that the implications for facilitation are that:
- individuals can learn for themselves through personal experience, at all learning levels,
- an individual’s learning provides for progression through the cognitive stages recognised by researchers in the field of learning,
- an individual’s cognitive progression can represent higher level learning, and
- individuals can consciously or unconsciously reject opportunities for higher level learning.
Section 6.2.1 Learning through crisis or tension
In this section I consider the idea that much of the unfacilitated, higher level learning that occurs does so in what can be termed ‘crisis’ situations. My interpretation is that while unfacilitated higher level learning does occur, it does not happen regularly about issues other than those creating crises and even in such situations paralysis of learning rather than stimulation can occur.
I also raise the issue that when higher level learning occurs in unfacilitated situations it is often outside the awareness of the learner. The inference is that the process is not one can that be consciously recalled for continuing use in acting.
Both Habermas (1979) and Salner (1982) refer to crises or tension as prompts for learning and the impetus for progression through the formative stages of an individual’s development. In a similar vein Perry (1970 p88) presents the proposition that student learning (at a higher level) took place as a response to crises. This occurred when their attempts to incorporate new observations into existing frameworks resulted in what he called "... a system of increasing complication and incongruity." The potential to learn at a higher level, could therefore be present because of the tension or dissonance for students. Learning, he argued required students to confront the existence of diversity and it required the skills of contextual thinking as an alternative to "..... helpless despair in a world devoid of certainty" (Perry 1970 p88). If the learning opportunity is taken up by the learner, it can lead to the perspective transformation of Mezirow’s (1991) concept of learning.
Thus it appears that the potential for learning at a higher level can be triggered by crisis situations.
Section 6.2.2 The value of awareness of how learning is occurring
In this section I use the literature to argue that for the most part individuals are not aware of how their learning is taking place, but that being aware enables them to choose when to learn.
At a day to day level of operations, Langer (1982) has described the phenomenon referred to as mindlessness. She is referring to how actions at a cogntitive level can be undertaken unconsciously and unproductively. Change at that level of cognitive processing requires conscious attention to metacognitive learning.
Argyris and his colleagues (Argyris and Schon, 1978 ; Argyris et al ,1985; Argyris 1987; Argyris, 1991a; Argyris and Schon 1996) suggest that individuals usually can be shown to demonstrate incongruity between what they espouse (claim) as foundational values for their behaviour and the values that can be interpreted from their actions. They argue that cognitive unawareness of the values (assumptions) underpinning behaviour is the norm.
Kitchener and King (1981) also recognise the unconscious holding of assumptions. In the presentation of their Reflective Judgement Model they suggest that most of the assumptions on which individuals found their shifts in epistemic position are not explicit. Argyris and colleagues and Kitchener and King are referring to the assumptions individuals use to frame how learning or change takes place and for change to occur at that level involves epistemic cognitive learning.
A lack of explicit attention to epistemic assumptions may explain why Klaczynski (1994), Salner (1986), Kitchener and King (1981) and Perry (1970) suggest that even learning that delivers cognitive progression may be less available for conscious recall and thus use in other situations even though it is founded on epistemic shifts.
My interpretation is that the above authors suggest that while learning at a higher level occurs it does not do so regularly or explicitly. This ‘lack of explicitness’ or knowing how learning is occurring may mean that its application in other situations is contingent upon that individual’s recognition (implicitly or unconsciously only) of its relevance to the new situation.
Burns (1995), in writing about the psychology of learning, explains autobiographical learning as "We do not attend consciously to learn most of our behaviour" (p101). As an example, he explains how learning societal behaviours arises through involvement in the culture of our communities, and the behaviours develop as "... we soak up the norms ..." (p101). This is autobiographically learning through self-reflection as we "... interpret our actions by the way other people respond to us". As such learning is self-reflective but outside awareness, and the process is not explicitly interactive with others.
Argyris and Schon (1996), Klaczynski (1994), Salner (1986), Langer (1982), Kitchener
and King (1981) and Perry (1970) are referring to the lack of awareness that individuals have of how they are learning. In general they advocate that the value in becoming aware is that it enables a learner to decide how to act in complex problematic situations. Bawden and colleagues at Hawkesbury (Bawden pers comm) have sought this outcome through experiential challenges based on the work of Salner (1986) and which seek to develop epistemic cognitive processing accessed through meta-cognitive processing. Similarly, Sadlersmith (1996) uses the theoretical foundation of experiential learning and learning styles to suggest attention to them can make explicit the learning process to produce increased learner self-reliance and autonomy.
So the value in knowing how to learn derives from initially becoming aware of an inability to improve a problematic situation because of the "way or ways" being used to address or learn about the situation. If action for change to the "way" of addressing or learning is taken at that stage it represents learning at a metacognitive level. What can follow is the bringing into focus an awareness of the influence of the epistemological frameworks that are operating. Action for change taken at that stage can alter epistemic frameworks and represents learning at an epistemic-cognitive level.
If learning that embraces all three levels of learning to achieve epistemic change is rarely practised by individuals, then the role of a facilitator in developing self-critical learning offers a means of promoting change in problematic situations. In Section 6.3 I consider literature relating to how facilitation can enable learning.
Section 6.3 Facilitation and the opportunity for enhanced experiential learning
This section explores the proposition that facilitation may convert learning potential, or the unawareness of learning that is occurring, into learning at higher levels. In doing so it examines the idea of whether or not facilitation can promote the practice of open discussion or ‘dialogue’ amongst learners and facilitators to develop expanded understanding about learning.
Lack of awareness of how learning is occurring, and thus the lack of awareness of the potential for using the process in other situations, was referred to earlier. Heron (1992) has agreed that facilitators are themselves learners in relation to facilitation. He recognises that some facilitators are unaware of the influence of their role in facilitation. This is a theme echoed by Schon (1983; 1987; 1990) and Argyris and Schon (1996). The material Heron (1992) presents deals with the politics of facilitation and how facilitators of learning should pay attention to their own metacognitive levels of learning about their facilitation.
Ackoff (1988 p241) suggests that although one cannot learn for another, which means that the only kind of development is self-development, it is possible to "... encourage and facilitate the development of others .....". Heron (1992) suggests that a facilitator can promote learning through modeling learning behaviours that "... elicit the emergence of ..... autonomy and wholeness ..." in the learner’s behaviour. Bawden et al (1984) and Macadam and Bawden (1985) also recognise facilitation of learning as appropriate in agricultural education situations. They have focussed on the facilitation of the process of learning from a learner-centred perspective.
Mezirow (1991) is another to recognise that there is a role for a facilitator in developing learning potential. He refers to educational interventions that assist adults to learn. He is referring to learning for transformation of meaning perspectives.
Habermas (1979) supports the usefulness of facilitation in learning. His examination of three concepts of developmental maturation draws similar conclusions to those of Perry (1970) about cognitive development arguing that progression through the formative stages of an individual’s development (which can be likened to Kitchener's (1983) cognitive, metacognitive and epistemic stages) is "... as a rule is crisis-ridden" (p74). That Habermas (1979) is inclusive of metacognitive and epistemic levels of learning can be inferred from his reference to the development of autonomy. He claims the ego acquires independence or autonomy through successfully solving problems or crises and through the increase of skills needed to do so where these problems or crises arise in relation to a person’s technical, practical and emancipatory interests. He contends that communicative action, that is action oriented to arriving at understanding through rational argument, realises the potential for change through learning. Such change can be encouraged and facilitated through the provision of structures supporting discourse (Habermas 1992). He refers to ‘linguistically mediated interaction’ (p201) or discourse, as the means of providing for the communicative action referred to earlier. Habermas’ (1992; 1979) discourse equates with the concept of ‘dialogue’ presented by Schein (1993), Isaacs (1993), Bohm (1990) and Senge (1990) where ‘dialogue’ is "... a flow of meaning in the whole group, out of which will emerge some new understanding" (Bohm 1990). Safran and Messer (1997) refer to the use of ‘dialogue’ to hasten the integration of different epistemologies and methodologies in clinical psychology. Their suggestion is that an ongoing ‘dialogue’ of the type referred to here can clarify differences among proponents of different theories and world views and provide a new understanding for each founded on contextualism and pluralism.
Nonaka (1994) has proposed a model of a spiral of knowledge creation that is an interplay between individuals’ tacit and explicit knowledge. "As the concept resonates around an expanding community of individuals, it is developed and clarified" (Nonaka 1994 p15). He suggests that this occurs naturally in organisations but also suggests that the frequency and quality of the occurrence of knowledge creation arising in this way can be increased and enhanced. Cayer (1997), Schein (1993), Isaacs (1993) and Bohm (1990) are promoting similar outcomes with their concept of a ‘dialogue’.
Schein (1993) has explored the role of ‘dialogue’ in relation to bridging the differences between organisational cultures and subcultures expressing its capability as enabling ".... the group to reach a higher level of consciousness and creativity through the gradual creation of a shared set of meanings and a "common" thinking process" (p43). In this form, Habermasian discourse or Bohmian ‘dialogue’ presents itself as a means whereby facilitators can develop the potentialities of learning situations. Cayer (1997) takes this further in suggesting that freeing ‘dialogue’ from its ‘utilitarian yoke’ and combining it with action science to communicate about differences may provide access to emancipatory learning that I have suggested is a particular case of epistemic learning.
My interpretation is that the changes in understanding that arise in ‘dialogue’ equate with the conceptualisations representing learning at a higher level about the issue at hand.
Dick and Dalmau (1991) in their development of intervention applications from the action science work of Argyris and Schon, present conditions that must be met to create change at a metacognitive level. They suggest applications for their work by ‘change agent’ practitioners and in doing so, register their support for the role of facilitation in developing change or learning potential. Senge (1990) and Boxer and Kenny (1990) are among those in the field of organisational development and consultancy who support facilitation for learning.
Argyris and Schon (1996) and Dick and Dalmau (1992) draw attention to the impact of the facilitator’s level of congruency of action theories of facilitation. They suggest that this will impinge on the level of learning achieved by participants and directly affect the functions of participation and collaboration.
The facilitation proposed by Dick and Dalmau (1991), Senge (1990), and Boxer and Kenny (1990) revolves around ways of generating ‘dialogue’. Senge (1990 p246) draws on the writing of Bohm and proposes that "In the absence of a skilled facilitator, our habits of thought continually pull us towards discussion and away from dialogue". ‘Dialogue’ he has previously described as "...allowing the group to discover insights not attainable individually"(p10). His description of discussion, again taken from Bohm, highlights its difference to dialogue ".. you fundamentally want your view to prevail" (p240).
"... Changing .... structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrative perspective ..." has been termed perspective transformation by Mezirow (1991 p167). He posits that transformations arise because of "... the accretion of transformed meaning schemes or through some externally imposed epochal dilemma ..." As well, he suggests that it may come through insightful discussion, a description that matches that of Bohm’s (1990) ‘dialogue’, or through contact with other events that contradict our established perspective. The impact of these challenges, argues Mezirow (1991) causes "pain" through its questioning of deeply held personal beliefs and values. The need for transformed meaning schemes precipitated by dilemmas or the contradictions, may arise through facilitated events that create self-awareness.
Argyris and Schon (1996) present the technique of ‘two column analysis’ as a means of focusing on an interaction and exposing it to scrutiny in a dialogue that generates
new interpretations and understanding. Dick and Dalmau (1992) use workbooks to generate dialogue between learners and facilitator. Their targetting of the identification of the learner’s assumptions about the interaction in question equates their technique with ‘dialogue’ illustrating the contention of Schein (1993) that ‘dialogue’ focuses on identifying the underlying assumptions "... particularly our own assumptions ..." (p43). Like Bohm (1990), Dick and Dalmau (1992) allow for the development of new understanding from the ‘dialogue’ and refer to the importance of surprises in the analysis.
Boxer and Kenny (1990) developed their ‘dialogue’ principles from the field of cybernetics. In dealing with their development of ‘The Economy of Discourses’ they suggest that ‘dialogue’ can contribute to client learning and their increased capabilities for designing improved future states.
Dick and Dalmau (1991) and Boxer and Kenny (1990) imply that the facilitator has a role to play in making clear to the learner, how the process of learning is taking place. The learner is then able to utilise this awareness in other situations.
In summary:
- facilitation may convert learning potential into learning at metacognitive and epistemic levels, but
- this requires that attention be paid to the adult learning principle that learners collaborate with facilitators about the process of learning, and to enable this
- requires the facilitator to create transparency of, and about, the learning process.
Section 6.4 Developing congruency of action theories of facilitation
In this section I explore the development of congruent action theories of facilitation of experiential learning. I consider transparency of facilitation and collaboration between facilitator and learners.
Transparency is not a term in general use in the literature about adult or experiential learning and its facilitation. As a general definition transparency means ‘to make something manifest or obvious or clear’ to others. The link between transparency and adult learning can be through collaboration. Collaboration is mentioned as a key principle of learning by Brookfield (1986), Knowles (1984; 1984a) and Mezirow (1981). Collaboration is advocated by these authors in relation to:
- identifying learners’ needs (that is, what it is about which they wish to learn)
- how the learning is to take place (that is, the methodologies available for use in the learning), and
- evaluation (that is, how the learners will assess their learning).
Collaboration requires that the facilitator is open or transparent about needs identification, methodologies and evaluation. Transparency here allows the learner to know how learning is taking place while also clarifying choices about how such learning is progressed and sequenced as is suggested by Heron (1992).
Section 6.4.1 Approaches to examining congruency of theories of action of facilitation
Within the concept of action science developed by Argyris and Schon (1996) successful facilitation requires a match between the facilitator’s espoused (claimed) and in-use (inferred from action) theories of action. The theme of congruency of theories of action is one presented by Argyris and his colleagues (Argyris and Schon 1996; Argyris 1987; Argyris et al 1985; Argyris and Schon 1978) as fundamental to practitioner effectiveness particularly in relation to higher than single loop learning. A similar perspective was adopted by Bawden and Packham (1993) in their educational practice in relation to systems education in which their institution undertook a self-study. Such a study has been described by Torbert (1983 p272) as "... necessary if any institution is to become increasingly effective over the long run (3 to 7 years) ..."
In a similar way, Piggot-Irvine (1996) used ‘critical friends’ in reflection to improve her practice of introducing action research in a university setting. She did this through making a process framework transparent to participants for scrutiny arguing that she changed to "One simple model outlined in order to provide [a] structural framework upon which other models could be hung (p7)."
In a similar way for action learning Webber and O’Hara (1997) refer to successful set formation as deriving from set facilitators being clear about their own philolophy of learning, a process foundational to developing congruency of theories of action. They argue that valuable learning comes from awareness of one’s own assumptions and beliefs about learning and an openness to being challenged and changed. Such a claimed belief can be enacted through transparency wherein participants are aware of a facilitators assumptions and can challenge for change.
Bawden and Packham (1993) and Piggot-Irvine (1996) examined the underlying assumptions being brought to the facilitation interaction. Their examinations involved exploring the level of congruency between their assumptions about facilitation and how that facilitation was practised. Argyris and Schon (1996) refer to the level of congruency between espoused theory and theories-in-use as a focus for action science when seeking to change practice, and it seems that the ability to display congruency is dependent on the epistemic position held about the interaction.
Argyris and Schon (1996) have demonstrated that theories-in-use can be interpreted from an individual’s actions and that most people are unaware or unconscious of mismatches between their espoused theories and their theories-in-use. It is mismatches that produce what they call the Model I values that govern behaviour rather than those of Model II.
The governing variables to which Argyris and his colleagues refer have remained the same through to their current writing (Argyris and Schon 1996). Table 6.1 shows the governing variables and their expected consequences.
Table 6.1 The governing variables and consequences of
Models I and II presented by Argyris and Schon (1996)
Model I
Governing variables
Consequences
- actor defines goals and tries to achieve them
- win, do not lose
- minimise generating negative feelings
- emphasise rationality
- defensive interpersonal and group relationships
- low freedom of choice
- reduced production of valid information
There are negative consequences for learning, because there is little public testing of ideas.
Model II
Governing Variables
Consequences
- valid information
- free and informed choice
- internal commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of its implementation
- minimally defensive interpersonal and group relationships
- high freedom of choice
- high risk taking
The likelihood of double loop learning is enhanced.
(Argyris et al 1985; Argyris and Schon 1996)
Argyris and Schon (1996 p80) suggest that the technique of two column analysis provides material "... to identify discrepancies between the writer’s espoused theories and the theories-in-use built into their actions." They further claim that "Awareness of such discrepancies makes it possible for the writers to assess the degree to which they have been skilfully unaware that their behaviour is counterproductive to their intentions."
Dick and Dalmau (1992) have provided a further step in the interpretive process of determining where discrepancies exist between espoused theories and theories-in-use. They have done so through relating the Argyris and Schon (1996) concepts of Model I and Model II governing variables with actions that typify behaviours matched to one or other of these. As well, the actions are consistent with the governing variables (values) that Argyris and Schon (1996) attribute to each model.
Brookfield (1992) has suggested a number of strategies for identifying assumptions. Of the five he presents, four use contrived situations involving ‘fictional characters’ (scenario analysis), ‘role reversal’ (critical debate), ‘hypothetical situations’ (simulations) and ‘identify others’ (heroes and villains). These each allow those involved to distance themselves from their own activities, but to in some way still engage with real experiences. His fifth strategy is similar to that of Dick and Dalmau’s (1992) developments with Argyris and Schon (1996) and their Model I and II governing variables. It is the approach of critical incidents, and it "... helps people to be aware of the assumptions framing their practice through analysis of their direct experience" (Brookfield 1992 p18). Piggot-Irvine (1996) used critical friends in a similar capacity to identify her "espousal-practice" gap.
Another practice for identifying the assumptions made about a situation as a basis for action, is that of memory work. Like two-column analysis, memory work is written by the person wishing to reflect. This is reported by Schratz (1996) for institutional settings and like the other methods mentioned above, it aims to provide a focus for developing congruent theories of action and thus changed behaviour.
The methods presented here can provide material to demonstrate the governing values evident in a person’s recollections of their actions. Critical reflection on those recollections can be used to improve practice.
Section 6.4.2 The relationship between congruency of action theories and epistemic positions of facilitation
Matching underlying assumptions of facilitation with action to maintain congruency of action theories involves examining the epistemic assumptions of facilitators.
Kitchener and King (1981) deal with identifying epistemic assumptions in their reflective judgement model. They inferred students self-unrecognised cognitive positions from student expressions about issues in their learning. From such positions they developed a model of reflective judgement of student learning which "... focuses on describing the development of epistemic assumptions and how these assumptions act as meaning perspectives that radically affect the way individuals understand and subsequently solve problems" (p160).
Interpreting this in relation to facilitation, suggests that epistemic assumptions or governing variables are influential in determining the effectiveness of facilitation in delivering its intended outcomes. Epistemic assumptions are the facilitator’s understanding of the nature of knowledge and limits of knowing about their facilitation which in turn influence how facilitation is practised.
Section 6.4.3 Linking underlying assumptions about facilitation and reflection-in-action
Action arising from reflection-in-action is founded on assumptions made at an epistemic level (Schon 1983; 1987 and Boud and Walker 1990). The action occurs in response to "surprising" happenings, and is action that is forthcoming both with and without conscious attention to what action to take (Schon 1987). Thus response to reflection-in-action in facilitation is founded on the epistemic assumptions held about facilitation by the facilitator. An explanation of such a response comes from Kitchener and King’s (1981) proposal that positions held epistemically influence how people respond to experiences. From this it may be argued that theories-in-use (how we act) are matched to espoused theory (how we claim we act) when the epistemic position (assumptions) an individual holds is matched with what they espouse. On that basis it seems possible to suggest that for a facilitator to act transparently with learners, she or he must hold an epistemic position founded on assumptions that place transparency within their mode of facilitation. From the work of Kitchener and King (1981) and Argyris et al (1985) it would be the same for all elements of facilitator behaviour.
When the facilitator’s epistemic assumptions are ones of transparency of learning and facilitation, the facilitator will respond automatically (reflection-in-action) (Schon 1983; 1987 and Boud and Walker 1990) and transparently in facilitation situations. They will thus be observed by learners to continue to demonstrate congruency between what they say and what they do in facilitating learning.
Section 6.5 Summary
Interpretation of the propositional material ralated to the facilitation of learning suggests that individuals can learn through personal experience at all learning levels without input from a skilled facilitator.
It seems that learning at what might be called a higher level (that is, learning in which double loop learning occurs) may begin with situations of crisis. The crisis may be generated by stimuli internal or external to the individual.
However, my interpretation from the literature is that while learning at a higher level occurs, it does not occur regularly or explicitly. The lack of explicitness of how learning is occurring may mean that its application in other situations remains contingent upon an individual’s recognition (implicitly or unconsciously only) of its relevance. The suggestion is that this does not happen regularly and thus learning at a transformative level is not regularly in use.
However, facilitation may convert learning potential into learning at metacognitive and epistemic levels. For that to occur requires attention to the adult learning principle wherein the learners collaborate about learning in the form of awareness of learning about their learning. Such collaboration involves the facilitator in the role of acting to create transparency of, and about the learning process, at all levels.
From my interpretation of the literature transparency of facilitation may be viewed in the following ways. The first occurs at task level where openness of process and involvement of learners in determining needs and modes of learning occurs. At that level, transparency of facilitation provides for collaboration between facilitator and learner to provide learner directed learning.
The second way is that of congruency between the espoused theory of the facilitation of learning held by the facilitator, and the theories-in-use that the facilitator applies in his or her operations with learners. For this latter perspective to be apparent in the practice of a facilitator, the espoused theory must be one of transparency, held at an epistemic level, so that it is also the theory-in-use of the facilitator. The reason for this is that when reflection-in-action takes place in a facilitated learning situation, it is the theories-in-use that will be manifest. It appears that if a theory-in-use of transparency of facilitation is held at an epistemic level then it will be the theory that directs reflection-in-action for the facilitator.
Finally, there is transparency of what the facilitator is feeling, understanding or interpreting in the interaction that is occurring with the learners. At this level, it is authenticity of interaction by the facilitator with the learners that is the focus of transparency. It involves modeling the learning behaviours of self-reflection and collaboration with learners about those reflections.
Having explored a range of literature relating to facilitation, it is now time in
Chapter 7 to consider the facilitation activities of the project, and to consider them in relation to the material that has been presented.
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